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Available online 11 March 2014In the course of the WEXICOM project at the Hans-Ertel-Centre for Weather Research of the
Deutscher Wetterdienst (DWD), a survey was conducted in autumn 2012 to question how
weather warnings are communicated to professional end-users in the emergency community
and how the warnings are converted into mitigation measures.
161 members of emergency services (e.g. fire fighters, police officers and civil servants) across
Germany answered an online questionnaire. Questions included user's confidence in forecasts,
their understanding of probabilistic information and their perception and use of uncertainty
in forecasts and warnings. A large number of open questions were selected to identify new
topics of interest, unknown problems, and research gaps in the field of communicating weather
information in Germany.
Results show that the emergency service personnel who participated in this survey generally
have a good appreciation of the uncertainty of weather forecasts. Although no single probability
threshold could be identified for organisations to start with preparatory mitigation measures, it
became clear that emergency services tend to avoid forecast based on lowprobabilities as basis for
their decisions.
This paper suggests that when trying to enhance weather communication by reducing the
uncertainty in forecasts, the focus should not only be on improving computer models and
observation tools, but also on the communication aspect, as uncertainty also arises from linguistic
origins. Here, improvements are also possible and thus uncertainty might be reducible.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).Keywords:
Uncertainty communication
Uncertainty perception
Warnings
Probabilistic forecasts
Emergency services1. Introduction
Severeweatherwarnings are, asweather forecasts in general,
uncertain (NRC, 2006). Uncertainties in weather warnings
arise from the chaotic character of the atmosphere, incomplete
knowledge and inaccuracy in weather observations and com-
puter models (NRC, 2006; Steinhorst, 2009).eg 6-10, 12165 Berlin,
.
r B.V. This is an open access aAlthoughwidely used, the term uncertainty is generally not
well defined andmeanings differ between scientific disciplines
and authors. Especially in interdisciplinary research, as social
scientists and natural scientists often have a different under-
standing of the calculability of uncertainty:while social scientists
argue that uncertainty is always connected to an unknown lack
of knowledge, natural scientists tend to see uncertainty as
probabilistic and assessable (Banse, 1996; Weichert, 2007).
Altogether, uncertainty is an often misunderstood and
therefore confusing expression for forecast users, and commu-
nicating uncertain weather warnings is a difficult task even to
experienced users such as emergency service personnel.rticle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
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these perspectives by differentiating knowledge and random-
ness. With respect to the latter, uncertainty arises from the
stochastic variability in known and observable phenomena
(and is called aleatory uncertainty) (NRC, 2006; Pate-Cornell,
1996). In this way, uncertainty can be understood by the
aspect of probability of occurrence and would thus be seen
as generally quantifiable (Weichert, 2007).
Secondly, uncertainty arises from the lack of knowledge or
incomplete observations (and is called epistemic uncertainty).
As the entirety cannot be completely known, it is generally
not quantifiable (Pate-Cornell, 1996: 96–97). Since some rare
events happen unexpectedly, e.g. because there is no observed
record of events, incalculable epistemic uncertainty is always
part of aleatory uncertainty. This missing knowledge leads to
uncertainty about the uncertainty or “second-order uncertainty”
(NRC, 2006) and is called ambiguity (Ellsberg, 1961)or vagueness
(Colyvan, 2008).
Ensemble-Prediction-Systems (EPS) are one way to make
estimates about the (aleatory) uncertainty of aweather forecast.
However, while a weather forecast can be enhanced by quan-
tifying this uncertainty, the ambiguity associated with the
interpretation and communication of the forecast remains
(Handmer and Proudley, 2007).
So far the topic of perception and use of uncertainty in
weather information has mainly been addressed in the US and
UK, maybe due to a wider use of probabilistic information in
weather forecasts in these countries (Gigerenzer et al., 2005).
Some of the early studies (e.g. Murphy et al., 1980; Sink,
1995) came to the conclusion that more emphasis should
be put into meteorological education to enhance people's
knowledge about numerical weather prediction. Other studies
(e.g. Gigerenzer et al., 2005) demand more emphasis on im-
proving the communication of statistics. However, some more
recent studies (e.g. Frick and Hegg, 2011; Morss et al., 2008)
concluded that understanding meteorological definitions cor-
rectly is not of preferential importance, as ultimately users
have to infer the information to their subjective preferences
and make their individual assessment of the situation.
The general perception of probabilities and uncertainties by
the public has been addressed in several studies (e.g. Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979). Most studies in the context of communi-
cation of weather forecasts and warnings are conducted
with laypersons (ABM, 2009; CFI, 2005; Joslyn and Savelli,
2010; Morss et al., 2008; Sink, 1995) or based on psycho-
logical experiments amongst university students (e.g. Joslyn
and Nichols, 2009). Little is known, however, about how
emergency service personnel perceive this information and
make use of it (Frick and Hegg, 2011; Handmer and Proudley,
2007; Steinhorst, 2009). The question how to communicate
weather warnings, especially to emergency services, has to be
addressed separately from the communication to the general
public, because this user group differs from other groups
and the general public regarding its needs and requirements
(Demeritt et al., 2007; Visschers et al., 2009). Only a few
studies address emergency management experts (e.g. Demeritt,
2012; Punkka and Rauhala, 2011; Frick and Hegg, 2011)
or show a sampling mixture of both laypersons and experts
(e.g. Handmer and Proudley, 2007). While surveys with lay-
persons usually have big samples consisting of several hundred
(e.g. Sink, 1995) or thousand (e.g. CFI, 2005) participants, expertsurveys usually have smaller samples consisting of several dozen
(e.g. Frick and Hegg, 2011) or a few hundred (e.g. Demeritt,
2012; Punkka and Rauhala, 2011) persons.
Based on these studies, research gaps include the topics of
understanding, interpretation and use of weather warnings
(e.g. Morss et al., 2008). Visschers et al. (2009) point out
that only little research has focused on user specific tailored
information, while Morss et al. (2008) criticise that most study
designs have experimental character and miss out real-world
settings. Whereas almost all studies come from the US, with
some exception of Switzerland, Scandinavia and the UK,
no scientific study addressing emergency services has been
conducted in Germany so far.
This paper starts with a methodological overview, pre-
senting the survey procedure and the questionnaire design.
Then survey results regarding the communication of weather
forecasts and warnings will be discussed. A special focus is on
the perception of uncertainty and the use of probabilistic
information by emergency services in Germany.
2. Methods
An explorative approach was chosen to gain new knowledge
about perception and use of uncertainty amongst the emergency
management community in Germany. Thus, an online survey
was conducted between September andOctober 2012. An online
approachwas chosen to enable the participation of a broad range
of experts within Germany in short time. In this study experts
are defined as professional users of weather information in
emergency services, civil protection or affiliated fields.
In preparation of the survey qualitative expert interviews
took place mainly with representatives from Deutscher
Wetterdienst (DWD) and Fire Brigades in order to identify
the key questions and to identify potential experts.
2.1. Sample and survey procedure
Since most experts could be identified within adminis-
trative agencies, a snowball sampling technique was used
to recruit participants starting with existing administrative
contacts of DWD: Users of the FeWIS tool – a DWD weather
warning tool especially designed for emergency services –
and other professional warning users of DWDwere provided
with a link to the online questionnaire via email and were
asked to forward it to their colleagues. The survey took place
between September 17th and October 12th 2012 and all
contributions were kept anonymous.
In total 161 experts completed the questionnaire. 89 par-
ticipants were fire fighters, with 40 of them being professional
fire fighters, 13 voluntary fire fighters, 5 plant fire fighters and
30 working in an emergency service command centre.
6 participants represented various federal agencies, 9
participants represented a state agency (Environmental
Ministries and Interior Ministries), and 34 participants repre-
sented a communal or regional agency (District Government,
City Council or likewise). The remaining 23 were either
policemen, paramedics, or other emergency managers from
e.g. transport or relief organisations.
The high number of participants from fire departments and
communal administrative well reflect the German emergency
management system which is mainly organised on that level.
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Based on a preliminary work, a semi-standardised ques-
tionnaire was designed. It consists of 20 questions, eleven
closed-ended and nine open-ended questions. The open-ended
questions had to be answered by typing in free format text,
either just key statements or longer remarks. The questionnaire
contained questions about communication tools and content of
weather warnings, problems with communicating and receiv-
ing weather warnings, dealing with uncertainty in weather
forecasts, confidence inweather warnings, decision thresholds,
lead times and finally the experts' affiliation. Note that not all of
the questions will be discussed here.
The results of the closed-ended (quantitative) data were
evaluated using mainly descriptive statistics, whereas the
open-ended (qualitative) answers were analysed with a
structuring content analysis (Mayring, 2001).
While some of the closed-ended questions were adapta-
tions from other studies (ABM, 2009; CFI, 2005; Demeritt,
2012; Joslyn and Savelli, 2010; Morss et al., 2008; Patt and
Schrag, 2003; Sink, 1995), most of the open-ended questions
resulted from key topics identified during the preliminary
expert interviews. This approach was chosen to enable com-
parability of results on the one hand, and to address new
topics and gain further expert information on the other hand
in order to emphasise the explorative character of the survey.
3. Results and discussion
The questionnaire started with simple multiple choice
questions regarding communication tools and content to build
up participants' confidence with the survey. Open-ended
questions then alternate with the closed-ended ones.
The first question addressed the weather phenomena,
which are relevant for the participants' work as emergency
service personnel (Table 1). It is not surprising that strong
wind and heavy rainfall were ranked as relevant for most of
the users, as winter storms are one of the major natural
hazards in Europe (Donat et al., 2011). Those events tend to
cause most harm to people and property (GDV, 2012) and
therefore are of major interest to emergency services.
A further more general open-ended question (Question 2)
enquired about the mitigation measures which are regularly
taken into accountwhen dealingwith severeweather. According
to the participants' answers fourmajor topics (no rank-ordering)
of mitigation measures could be identified by clustering all
given answers using structuring content analysis: First,
the survey participants state that intensified observationTable 1
Most relevant weather phenomena for emergency services
(n = 161; row percentage, multiple answers allowed).
Weather phenomena %
Strong wind and gusts 92
Heavy rainfall 85
Thunderstorms 58
Snow 46
Glazed frost 44
Hail 44
Continuous rain 37
Thawing 18(including the consultation of the weather service's regional
office via telephone formore detailed information) is one of the
main measures, which follow up a severe weather warning.
Secondly, some of the participants state that they just forward
information (including e.g. internal staff, municipalities and
outdoor event organisers) after receiving a warning. This
might be due to the gateway role of e.g. command centres
and the fact that most warning recipients are not necessarily
the ones to undertake ad hoc measures on the ground. The
latter becomes clearer when looking at the two remaining
mitigation measures, which are also of a more strategic
nature. First, personnel preparatory measures are stated. This
includes the call-up of off-duty units or extending the length
of service. In addition, non-personnel preparatory measures
are also taken into account. Inter alia, they include situation
assessments and the deployment or relocating of technical
equipment.
It has to be mentioned that the question was not related
to a specific event and did not include when mitigation
measures were taken or who within the organisation was
involved. Such more detailed questions about mitigation
measures will be addressed in a follow-up study.
3.1. Communication of weather forecasts and warnings
Experts stated that the Deutscher Wetterdienst is not
the exclusive source communicating weather information to
emergency services. About 37% of the participants state that
they or their organisations serve as a gateway to communi-
cate weather warnings to related organisations, either in a
top-down communication chain within the organisation or
towards affiliated local agencies. In addition, they forward
information to selected local businesses or to organisers of
public outdoor events (Question 3). DWD is the only agency
to issue official warnings by law (single-voice-principle). In
addition, some private weather companies provide standard
weather information to the general public. Nevertheless,
problems which might occur due to that, will not be addressed
in this paper, but should be considered for further investigations.
The official weather warning system in Germany is
organised in a three-step process. Early warning information
(Frühwarninformation) is based on numerical models including
Ensemble-Prediction-System (EPS) forecasts. They are imple-
mented by DWD into a 7-day forecast (Wochenvorhersage
Wettergefahren) for public use. This forecast includes informa-
tion about expected severe large-scale weather phenomena
and severe weather events with qualitative statements about
forecast uncertainty (discussed later). Secondly, an alert or
watch (Vorwarninformation) is issued up to 48 to 12 h before
an expected event. These forecasts are provided five times a
day with different reports (Warnlagebericht) for the whole
country and twelve regions respectively. The regions represent
the larger German states or a combination of smaller ones.
Ultimately, warnings are issued on county level. The lead times
depend on the kind of weather event with a maximum of 12 h
(Weingärtner et al., 2009).
Some questions in the survey dealt with communication
problems the participants might have experienced while
receiving or forwarding weather warnings within the emer-
gency community. Open-ended questions (Question 4 and 5)
provided detailed information about such communication
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this point. The participants indentified the following major
problems (no rank-ordering): a) short warning lead times,
which do not correspond with the users' needs, b) too many
warnings, which may result in a dulling or crying wolf effect,
c) misinterpretation of weather information, d) dealing with
uncertainty in weather forecasts and warnings, e) inappropri-
ateness of warnings with respect to geographical characteristics
of the warning area (i.e. size, topography, etc.), f) conflicts
between officialwarnings and information provided by others or
own observations, and g) some technical problems receiving the
warning. Some of these problems are discussed below, with the
main focus on the uncertainty issue.
3.2. Perception of uncertainty in weather forecasts and warnings
3.2.1. Conﬁdence in weather forecasts and warnings
Confidence inweather forecasts is not directly related to the
understanding of forecast uncertainty (Morss et al., 2008). But
it can give a hint about the participants' perception of weather
forecast and their expressions of second-order uncertainty
(NRC, 2006).
In risk perception and communication research the distinc-
tion between confidence and trust has proven to be useful
(Frick andHegg, 2011; Luhmann, 2000; Siegrist andCvetkovich,
2000; Siegrist, 2001). While trust refers to the reliability of
information source and the informant (Frick and Hegg, 2011),
confidence refers to experience and evidence (Siegrist, 2001).
Thus, the question about trust aims at the experts' trust in the
Meteorological Service or the media in general, whereas the
question about confidence refers to someone's own association
towards the reliability of a weather forecast or a warning.
It can generally be assumed that there is a negative
correlation between the level of knowledge about a specific
hazard and people's trust into involved stakeholders (Luhmann,
2000). In other words, the less knowledge someone has about a
hazard, themore he trusts people in charge and their estimations
(Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000). In reverse that means, that the
more knowledge someone has about a specific issue, the less he
relies on the assistance of others. Thus, trust is important in
situations where the essential knowledge for decision making is
missing (Siegrist, 2001).
It can be assumed that the meteorological knowledge of
the emergency service personnel involved in this survey can0%
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Fig. 1. Confidence in 2-daybe ranked slightly higher than the meteorological knowledge
of the general public, due to their daily exposure to weather
warnings and hazards, regardless of differences within the
group of experts.
In the survey the topic of confidence was addressed with
the question “How high is your confidence in the accuracy of
a 2-day/7-day forecast regarding a) temperature, b) chance
of precipitation, c) amount of precipitation, d) chance of
thunderstorm or e) chance of storm?” (Question 6).
A matrix was provided so that the different forecasts
could be answered separately. Scaling was pre-defined by the
terms very low, low, high and very high (Fig. 1).
Temperature forecasts achieve the highest ranks in confi-
dence and forecasts concerning the amount of precipitation
the lowest. 89% of the participants rated the confidence in a
2-day temperature forecast as high or very high. The chance of
storm and chance of precipitation forecasts were rated by the
participants as high or very highwith 73% and 70% respectively.
The values decrease to 63% for chance of thunderstorm
forecasts and only 50% to forecasts of amount of precipitation.
It becomes apparent that confidence in forecasts addressing
absolute values, like amount of precipitation, is lower than the
confidence in forecasts addressing probabilities. These results
correspond with other studies referring to laypersons (Morss
et al., 2008).
It also becomes clear that the participants have a good
conception about the skill of weather forecasts, as 2-day
temperature forecasts are generally more accurate than
probability of precipitation forecasts or even forecasting the
correct amount of precipitation (Balzer, 1994). Likewise, the
local chance of thunderstorm occurrence is hard to estimate
and therefore correctly indicated with lower confidence by
the members of the emergency services.
Compared to the 2-day forecast, the confidence in 7-day
forecast is lower, with the ratio of the respective weather
phenomena remaining equal (Fig. 2). Again, the fact that
forecast uncertainty generally increases with forecast lead
time (NRC, 2006) is correctly indicated by the participants of
the survey (Joslyn and Savelli, 2010; Morss et al., 2008).
Various reasons for these responses can be considered:
As pointed out, confidence is highly depending on individual
experiences. The experts gain knowledge not only in their
daily work routine when dealing with weather warnings,
but also in their everyday life. Temperature forecasts andhigh very high
ecipitation Chance of storm Chance of thunderstorm
n = 155
forecasts (n = 155).
0%
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Temperature Chance of precipitation Amount of precipitation Chance of storm Chance of thunderstorm
n = 168
Fig. 2. Confidence in 7-day forecasts (n = 168).
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communication in Germany (Gigerenzer et al., 2005) and
thus experts' experience with these formats can be consid-
ered as rather high. Furthermore, it could also be argued that
the survey participants “remember some forecast errors better
than others and this in turn effects the estimated frequency”
(Joslyn and Savelli, 2010). Hence, the participants are more
conscious of uncertainties in some forecasts then in others.
Also, the correct phrasing of a forecast – meaning the
verbalisation or the presented format – can have an effect
on users' information assessment. Sink (1995) shows that
wrong or ambiguous use of terms can lead tomisunderstand-
ingsandeventually result inunintendedreactions.
3.2.2. Uncertainty in weather forecasts and warnings
Already in 1980 Murphy et al. recommended that proba-
bility information should be included into weather forecasts
in order to communicate forecast uncertainty. They came to
the conclusion that people, misunderstanding probabilistic
predictions, also misunderstood ‘traditional’ or deterministic
weather forecasts. Hence, not the statement about probability,
but rather the predicted weather phenomenon was misunder-
stood. They conclude that intensifying public's meteorological
education was necessary. Gigerenzer et al. (2005) argue that
people's confusion with probabilities is related to a missing
reference: “to improve risk communication with the public,
experts need to specify the reference class, that is, the class of
events to which a single-event probability refers” (Gigerenzer
et al., 2005). They conclude that the public has to be better
educated in statistics. However, Morss et al. (2008) point out
that the correct meteorological definition is not always
needed for decision making, yet the likelihood of an event is
sufficient on its own. They argue that “even if people knew the
technical correct interpretation, they would still have to infer
what it meant for their interests” (Morss et al., 2008).
It is not only a limited meteorological or statistical knowl-
edge that leads to misunderstandings of (probabilistic) weather
forecasts. Furthermore, the chosen format by which a forecast is
communicated is an additional source of ambiguity. The forecast
itself and the perception of the used formats are sources
of greater uncertainty or ambiguity than the predicted event or
the interpretation of the weather phenomena (Handmer and
Proudley, 2007). The question is, if information should be bestcommunicated e.g. via text, absolute or relative value, via
diagrams or graphics (Ibrekk andMorgan, 1987; Morss et al.,
2008; Patt and Schrag, 2003; Visschers et al., 2009). In a
broader sense the question is also, if information has to be
provided as a deterministic statement, that is for instance
information about amount or speed, or if forecast uncertainty
can be useful to the users and should therefore as well be
provided. In turn, this is followed up by the question which
uncertainty format fits best to address users' needs.
As stated above, uncertainty can be presented by using
relative frequency or probability (e.g. Joslyn and Nichols,
2009), various graphic visualisations (e.g. Monmonier, 2006;
Spiegelhalter et al., 2011) or verbal statements (e.g. Patt and
Schrag, 2003). Even though many studies address this topic,
there is still some research needed on the format to present
and communicate uncertainty in weather forecasts (Joslyn and
Nichols, 2009; Morss et al., 2008).
In this survey the topic of uncertainty communication
was first addressed by a question relating to users' favoured
format for medium range weather forecasts, meaning a 7-day
forecast. The single-choice question had three pre-defined
answers: single values, range of values, or probabilistic values.
In the questionnaire each possible answer was additionally
illustrated by a descriptive forecast statement (Question 7).
There are two possible ways to understand uncertainty
in this case. First, range of values and probabilistic values
can both be seen as a statement about uncertainty. E.g. Morss
et al. (2008) rate all communication formats other than a
single valued prediction as a statement about uncertainty.
In reverse, the use of single valued prediction would be seen
as a deterministic statement.
Secondly, single values and range of values can both be seen
as statements related to thresholds. Both deal with concrete
numbers and values which could be applied to those threshold
emergency services used within their organisations. Indeed,
probabilistic values could as well be related to thresholds,
for instance, if decisions are linked to different degrees of
likelihood of an event, but this does not correspond to the
common practice in Germany.
The analysis shows that a compulsory declaration of single
values seems not necessary. Only 6 out of 161 participants
preferred using deterministic forecasts rather than probabilistic
range forecasts. On the contrary, the use of a range of values and
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It is possible that the participants grasp meteorology not as an
exact science as it does not provide them with clear and robust
single-valued predictions, or that the participants know from
experience that commonly no single-valued predictions are
made for amiddle range forecast. In addition, it might aswell be
that the participants chose the category range of values out of
their practical knowledge, if they use thresholds in their daily
work with weather forecasts and therefore have a need for ‘set
numbers’, although neglecting the need for the declaration of
single values.
But the participants' favour for probabilistic range forecasts
does not necessarily mean that users can ultimately resign
deterministic statements for their dailywork. Thus, itwas asked
to what extent the users rely on deterministic forecasts, such as
detailed information about expected amount of precipitation or
wind speed (Question 8). 85% of the participants confirmed the
need of such deterministic statements. Only 15% stated that
they could work with probabilistic information. This relation
does not vary much with participants' affiliations.
The question whether uncertainty should be better com-
municated via verbal or numerical terms was asked separately,
because of the assumption that these formats are a major
source of uncertainty and ambiguity (Visschers et al., 2009).
This is particularly the case with verbal statements about
uncertainty (Rogell, 1972). Theproblem is that verbal statements
themselves are highly ambiguous or vague and consequent-
ly a source of further uncertainty. Colyvan (2008) points
out that one can differentiate between four different kinds
of uncertainty of linguistic origin. He distinguishes context
dependence, underspecificity, ambiguity and vagueness.While
context dependence points to the fact that a statement fails to
specify the context in which the term is to be understood,
underspecificity points to the fact that the term is not as specific
as needed. Uncertainty arising from ambiguity means that a
word can be used in more than one way and it is not clear in
which way it is being used from the given context. Finally,
vagueness is a source of uncertainty arising from unspecific use
of a term in a borderline-case sense.
DWD is currently not using numerical expressions of
uncertainty in its general weather warnings. As briefly
addressed above, the 7-day forecast on weather hazards
(Wochenvorhersage Wettergefahren) uses only verbal state-
ments about uncertainty. The terms possible (möglich), likely
(wahrscheinlich), and very likely (sehr wahrscheinlich) are
used by default. None of these terms are related to an explicit
numerical value.
In the survey participants were asked to assign numerical
values to these verbal statements (Question 9). The values
0% to 100% were pre-defined in 10% steps for each of the
verbal statements. Results2 show that nominations scatter
extremely (Fig. 3) and cover almost the whole range of
probabilistic associations for all three verbal statements1 In relative terms (4%, 66%, 30%) these results ﬁt with ﬁndings from other
studies, e.g. 10%, 59%, 31% in a 2005 study for NOAA regarding laypersons
(CFI Group, 2005: 135).
2 Comparing the mean values Sink (1995) and Rogell (1972) came to
similar associations with their studies regarding laypersons.from 10% (even 0%) until 100%. In addition, an overlapping of
verbal statements can clearly be seen.
This extreme dispersion is a good example of uncertainty
within the verbal statements themselves. Especially the term
possible is highly underspecific and thus subject to major
variability in interpretation. In addition, the linguistic proxim-
ity or vagueness (shown by the overlapping) of statements
DWD uses in its weekly forecast, is a further source of errors.
Hence, all terms together are highly ambiguous as it is not clear
in which way they should be used correctly. Adding now
numerical probabilities and thus aleatory uncertainty results
in a ‘doubled’ uncertainty (Sink, 1995) whatever source the
linguistic uncertainty arises from.
To what extent this effects the interpretation and use of
weather warnings is a need for further research. But it seems
almost certain that for the use of probabilistic information in
weather forecast and warnings such aspects should not be
disregarded.
3.3. Use of uncertainty in weather forecasts and warnings
After receiving awarning, users have to be able to take action
and make use of the forecast by converting the warning into a
mitigation measure. Here, the lead time between receiving a
warning and starting first mitigation measures matters. It is
commonly indicated in minutes, hours or days. This time spread
can massively vary depending on the organisation and the
measure undertaken (Joslyn and Savelli, 2010). In addition, a
forecast might also be seen as a turning point from which
reactions towards a predicted event are implemented (Demeritt,
2012; Joslyn and Savelli, 2010). In this study several questions
covered the topic of how a forecast is applied by end-users.
One question asked which lead time the organisation
needed to start with first preparatory measures (Question 10).
Participants were asked to answer this open-ended question
providing time data. 155 of the 161 participants answered
this question. Afterwards statements were classified for better
analysis. Classification was made according to organisational
aspects, such as work day or shift work, and the meteorological
predictability: For short range forecasts the latter is commonly
subdivided into short range forecasts (72 h), shortest range
forecasts (12 h) and nowcasting (up to 2 h). These three
forecast types vary in the use of forecasting tools and especially
in forecast skill regarding different weather phenomena.
Results show that again nominations scatter considerably
(Fig. 4). Main differences become clear comparing the
statistical values. The range of nominations starts with
10 min and ends with up to 7 days. Especially the outlier is
extreme. Nevertheless, approximately 50% (median value)
of the organisations need a lead time of less than 3 h for a
general mitigation measure.
Even if it is obvious that the chance for or intensity of
implementation of a preparatory mitigation measure varies
with lead time, the maximal values are surprisingly high.
On the one hand, this might be related to the fact that
the experts see preparatory measures as extensive and well
prepared measures instead of ad hoc solutions. Therefore,
they state the upper end of the time spread. It can, however,
not be concluded from these statements, whether they or
their organisations candeal quickerwith the hazard if necessary.
Secondly, it might also be possible that the participants did not
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Fig. 4. Organisational lead times needed for preparatory actions (boxplots, all participants and selected subgroups).
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Fig. 3. Numeric associations to verbal expressions of uncertainty (mean values: 36.5% (possible), 57.8% (likely), 78.7% (very likely), n = 157).
298 T. Kox et al. / Atmospheric Research 158–159 (2015) 292–301know the meteorological constraints of weather warnings,
thus overestimating forecasting abilities and thus came up
with such long lead times. Yet it is striking that these results
do not correspond with the operational practice of meteoro-
logical services and the possible lead times for thunderstorm or
some winter storm forecasts (Weingärtner et al., 2009).
A second question was devoted to the understanding
of lead time as a threshold or turning point (Question 11).
Participants were asked to state the start of preparatory
mitigation measures3 due to information about the probability
of occurrence.3 As shown before, several different mitigation measures are taken into
account. Addressing the lead times for differentmitigationmeasures separately
was shortly considered but thenwithdrawn due to the explorative character of
the survey and the heterogeneous structure of the participants and their
afﬁliations. The number of each case would have been too low to draw a
conclusion. Although a threshold for a singlemeasure doesnot necessarily have
to correlate with all measures within an organisation, further research might
consider addressing mitigation measures separately.This question builds up on the assumption that uncer-
tainty information at an early point of a possible event can
enhance the preparation of mitigation measures (Murphy,
1994; Palmer, 2002; Richardson, 2000; Roulston et al., 2006;
Zhu et al., 2002).4
Results show that 6% of the participants would start with
preparatory mitigation measures based on a warning with at
least 90% probability of occurrence. Still 55% would only start
above 70%probability of occurrence. But 92% of theparticipants
would start above a 50% chance of an event to occur. No single
threshold category reaches an agreement of more than
37% (Fig. 5). Again, that the distribution of nominations is
extremely scattered is depending on individual risk perceptions
(Joslyn and Savelli, 2010) but also onorganisational factors. In his
study for the British MetOffice Demeritt (2012) came to similar4 E.g. Roulston et al. (2006) showed the economic value of such forecast
information for road maintenance services.
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Fig. 5. Preparatory measures based on a probability threshold (n = 161).
299T. Kox et al. / Atmospheric Research 158–159 (2015) 292–301results and found that users do not want to react to forecasts of
low probabilities.5
Searching for explanations to these findings, Sink (1995)
stated that also the phrasing of the question matters, because
“plans could mean something different to every person”. So,
such answers should be examined carefully as further am-
biguity is involved. There are almost uncountable sources
of second-order uncertainty of different influence on the
perception by warning recipients. In the field of weather
forecasting and warnings, extreme events may also be an
influential factor on uncertainty perception and decision
making. Joslyn and Savelli (2010) point out that “the same
probability (e.g. ’30%’) applied to a more serious side effect
(cancer) is considered greater than when applied to a less
serious side effect (headache).” In other words, the severity of
consequences is assessed, and the effects of underestimating
the more serious consequences are obviously higher than
making less serious errors, especially if a person believes
that he might be affected (Jungermann and Slovic, 1993).
But in this case the forecast user does not refer probability
to likelihood (and thus to uncertainty) but to a specific risk.
Contrary to some private enterprises (e.g. road maintenance
services or energy sector), consequences of false alarms and
missed events are difficult to quantify in the public sector and
especially in case of emergency services. Costs and benefits
of emergency services often do not apply to the same person
or organisation, and governmental social responsibility and
various non-monetary costs play a major role.
4. Conclusion
The perception and use of weather warnings have been
addressed in several studies in the past, mainly in the USA and
UK. However, research on this topic has not been sufficient yet
for Germany, especially for the emergency service community.
Uncertainty is an integral part ofweather forecasts and thus
a major issue with respect to communicating those forecasts
and warnings. It must be distinguished between different5 He concluded that this preferences are not in line with the “scientiﬁc
orthodoxy and [with] the government’s emphasis on taking early and proactive
action in response to emerging threats” (Demeritt, 2012).sources of uncertainty. First of all, uncertainty arises from
the stochastic variability in known and observable phenomena
(aleatory uncertainty), andmissing knowledge and incomplete
observations (epistemic uncertainty). Furthermore, the lack of
knowledge results in uncertainty about uncertainty (or second-
order uncertainty). As shown, this is especially the case for
verbal statements in weather warnings, which are often
underspecific and ambiguous.
Statements about confidence in weather forecasts show
that the emergency service personnel who participated in this
survey generally have a good sense of second-order uncertain-
ty in weather forecasts. However, this should not be regarded
as a clear sign for preferring probabilistic forecasts, as the level
of confidence in forecasts can only be an indication about the
perception of second-order uncertainty.
Nevertheless, when trying to enhance weather forecasts
by reducing uncertainty, one should not only focus on im-
proving computer models and observation tools, but should
not forget to keep an eye on the communication aspect of a
forecast as well. Here, improvements might also be possible as
inherent second-order uncertainty might be reducible.
Colyvan (2008) points out that it might be the most
obvious way to be more careful with the language. Thus,
the wording of forecasts and warnings should be done
accurately. Standardising the usage of numerical and verbal
statements of probability could enhance weather commu-
nication. But regarding the overlapping and variability in
interpretations (Fig. 3), uncertainty should better be com-
municated with range of estimates rather than giving a
single-valued estimation. Nonetheless, words are still useful
to describe uncertainty, because it avoids the problem that
the forecasters have to reach consensus on a single pro-
bability estimate or otherwise completely omit uncertainty
information (Patt and Schrag, 2003). In addition, some research
(e.g. Wallsten et al., 1986) show that many people understand
words better than numbers.
But while numeric expressions of uncertainty are objec-
tively more precise than verbal expressions (Spiegelhalter
et al., 2011), words are still used by people (forecasters and
users) when they have to report and explain a probability to
others (Visschers et al., 2009). The authors suggest to use a
combination of verbal and numeric expression to ensure that
300 T. Kox et al. / Atmospheric Research 158–159 (2015) 292–301on one hand people have the right information and on the
other hand the forecast fits with users' preferences, needs and
their level of understanding (Sink, 1995; Visschers et al., 2009).
The survey results show that this varies amongst users.
Thus, in order for them to be able to take effective action,
tailored warnings could be appropriate. This idea was already
brought up as an argument by Rogell in 1972, but as Visschers
et al. (2009) point out, there is still research needed in this field.
Forecast end-users are a heterogeneous group (Doswell,
2003; Murphy, 1993). The survey results show that even within
one specific group like emergency services the perceptions,
needs and capabilities vary considerably. No single proba-
bility threshold could be identified for organisations to start
with preparatory mitigation measures. But it became clear
that emergency services tend to avoid forecast based on low
probabilities as a basis for their decisions. This might be due
to experts referring the probability statement not to the
likelihood of an event but to possible consequences and thus
to a specific risk. In the case of the emergency community
those consequences are difficult to quantify.
Furthermore, these thresholds are quite different from the
numeric associations of verbal expressions of uncertainty.
But while the latter shows the relation between wording
and numeric probability based on a hypothetical forecast
situation, the thresholds for starting preparatory mitigation
measures refer to a (hypothetical) forecast situation addressing
individual and organisational decision making and activeness.
Beside the weather context, several other factors bias this
decision making process: Such as the emergency service
personal's individual expertise and scope of action, and the
overall organisational culture, such as guidelines, financial and
personal resources, or accountabilities (Fahlbruch et al., 2012).
Moredetailed research is needed in this field. Special attention
should lie on addressing the consequences of weather and
weather warnings. Due to the limited potential for quantita-
tive methods, qualitative methods should be applied in further
research. Interviews and in-field observations could be appropri-
ate tools to gain more information about this specific topic.
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Appendix A. Survey questionnaire
The survey questions discussed in this paper are presented
below. Please note that the original questionnaire consisted of
20 different questions in German. This is a translated selection
and the question numbers and order do not correspond to the
actual questionnaire. The formatting has been altered for space
considerations.
Question 1:
Which of the followingweather phenomena ismost relevant
for your work?(Multiple answers allowed)
a) Strong wind and gusts, b) Heavy rainfall, c) Thunder-
storms, d) Snow, e) Glazed frost, f) Hail, g) Continuous
rain, h) Thawing
Question 2:
Whichmitigationmeasures are regularly taken into account
on the basis of a severe weather warning?
(Open-ended question)
Question 3:
Do you or your organisation forward weather information
and/or warnings to other organisations, or provide other
organisations with weather information? If so, who is
addressed?
(Open-ended question)
Question 4:
Did you experience any problems when forwarding
weather information to other agencies or organisations?
Please give examples.
(Open-ended question)
Question 5:
Did you experience any problems when receiving weather
information from other agencies or organisations? Please
give examples.
(Open-ended question)
Question 6:
How high is your confidence in the accuracy of a 2-day/
7-day forecast regarding a) temperature, b) chance of
precipitation, c) amount of precipitation, d) chance of
thunderstorm or e) chance of storm?
(Scale: very low, low, high and very high.)
Question 7:
Medium range weather forecasts (e.g. 7-days) tend to have
greater uncertainty than short range weather forecasts
(e.g. 1–3-days). In which way do you prefer to receive
medium range weather forecasts?
a) Single values (e.g. “the maximum temperature will
be 35 °C”)
b) Range of values (e.g. “the most likely temperature
range will be between 32 °C and 36 °C”
c) Probabilistic values (e.g. “there is a 85% chance of
the temperature exceeding 28 °C; a 30% chance of
the temperature exceeding 30 °C; a 10% chance of
the temperature exceeding 36 °C”)
Question 8:
If in the future forecasts will be made on the basis of
probability statements, would you still need deterministic
information (i.e. detailed information on rainfall or wind
speeds etc.) for your work?
(Yes, No)
Question 9:
Imagine DWD states the advent of an upcoming storm in
your region with the indications ‘possible’/‘likely’/‘very
likely’. Which of the following probabilities would you
associate to this forecast?
(Scale: 0%–100%; 10% intervals)
301T. Kox et al. / Atmospheric Research 158–159 (2015) 292–301Question 10:
Which lead time do you need to start with (preliminary)
actions?
Please indicate the approximate time needed for the most
important actions.
(Open-ended question)
Question 11:
A storm is forecasted for the next day. On which forecast
would you or your agency/organisation start with prelim-
inary measures? Based on a probability of…
(Open-ended question, numerical probability expres-
sions only)
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